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CASE NOTES
New Jersey3 1 to the effect that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the
constitution of the United States have no application to the trial of
cases in state courts, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment affords no protection against self-incrimination. 32
In conclusion it is seen that most of the courts that have dealt
with the matter have admitted into evidence the results of chemical tests
where the tests were administered voluntarily, but have become concerned
where the tests were taken under compulsion, or not on a purely volun-
tary basis.
To be sure, the relationship of alcohol to automobile accidents and
the role which it plays in the growing death toll on the highways of the
nation, renders it a problem of the first magnitude. The questions in-
volved in the use of compulsion to administer chemical tests moreover
involve many social as well as constitutional factors and must, for their
complete determination, abide the limitations placed by public policy
and the natural reluctance on the part of the courts to admit evidence
procured by force to sustain future criminal prosecution.
With heavier penalites being imposed on persons convicted of driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquors,33 as in Illinois, it is
exceedingly doubtful whether it be a wise policy to permit police
officers to force a chemical test upon an unwilling motorist. The op-
portunities for abuse of the power and the temptation to attempt to
bribe the arresting officers before they carry out the test would be strong
indeed.
PARENT AND CHILD-PARENT HELD LIABLE
FOR UNAUTHORIZED MEDICAL SERVICES
RENDERED CHILD
A physician brought action against the parents of a minor child, to
recover a reasonable fee for professional services rendered to the
child without express authorization by the parents. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey reversing the lower courts, held that where a physician,
to whom the child was sent by physician's co-suitor, did not act
officiously and intended to make a charge for services, the child's parents,
31211 U.S. 78 (1908).
32 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
33 111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 95 , § 144, as amended, 1953, June 24, Laws 1953, H.B.
No. 475, S 1. The amendment provides as follows: "(a) It is unlawful and punish-
able as provided in subdivision (b) of this section for any person who . . . is under
the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drug to drive any vehicle within this
state. (b) Every person who is convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished
by imprisonment for not less than two days nor more than 1 year, or by fine of not
less than $100 dollars nor more than $1000 or by both such fine and imprisonment."
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who had refused to provide the child with immediate medical aid
necessary to prevent permanent injury, were under a legal obligation
to pay for the medical services rendered. Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A. 2d
390 (N.J., 1953).
The question whether the father is under a legal obligation to provide
for the necessary maintenance of his minor children has led to a con-
siderable conflict of opinion and adjudication in the courts of different
states. At common law neither the child nor any third party who ven-
tured to supply the child with necessaries had any cause of action
against the parents to enforce the duty of support, which Blackstone
termed "a principle of natural law,"' unless based on the principle of
agency, expressed or implied in fact.2 While it is true, beyond any
question, that the common law imposed upon parents the duty of
protecting, educating, and maintaining their children, it is also true that
the common law never afforded any means of enforcing this obligation. 3
In England and a number of states in this country which follow the
common law rule it is maintained that the moral duty in such cases to
provide proper support does not constitute a legal duty, enforceable
by action. Because it is considered a moral duty, courts have held, as in
Kelley v. Davis,4 that a parent cannot be charged for necessaries fur-
nished by a stranger for his minor child, except upon a promise to
pay for them and such promise is not to be implied from a mere moral
obligation. These cases hold that the omission of duty from which a
jury may find a promise by implication of law must be a legal duty,
capable of enforcement by process of law.
Thus, under this rule, the only basis for holding a father liable for
necessaries furnished to his child by others is that the child has an
express or implied authority from the father to make such contracts.5
The common law rule has been modified to allow a third person
to recover in cases where the authority of an infant to bind the father
for necessaries may be inferred from slight evidence. In Hollingsworth v.
Swedenborg" the court was of the opinion that, unless there existed an
express contract, or one implied in fact, a father could not be sued
1 1 B1. Comm. 447.
2 Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 482 (Exch. Div., 1840).
a Wellesley v. Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russ. 23 (1826).
449 N.H. 187 (1870).
5 Armstrong Clothing Co. v. Boggs, 90 Neb. 499, 133 N.W. 1122 (1912); Ramsey
v. Ramsey, 121 Ind. 215, 23 N.E. 69 (1889); Johnson v. Smallwood, 88 Ill. 73 (1878);
Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N.J. L. 383 (1876); Kelley v. Davis, 49 N.H. 187 (1870);
Swain v. Tyler, 26 Vt. 9 (1853); Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 348 (1845); Mortimore v.
Wright, 6 M. & W. 482 (1840).
649 Ind. 378 (1875).
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for the price of necessaries provided for his infant son, yet very slight
circumstances would justify a jury in finding a contract on his part.
Such an inference is drawn where a child purchases necessaries without
the father's consent or knowledge and the father subsequently learns
of these purchases and either remains silent or makes some objection
without returning the goods. 7 It appears that the variation was devised
in an effort to achieve a measure of justice with respect to the main-
tenance of a child in comparison with that available to a neglected wife.
The law imposes an obligation on a husband for the benefit of the
deserted wife without regard to whether or not there was any agency
in fact, but no such obligation exists in similar circumstances involving
the minor children.8 This modification has been criticized in the instant
case as ineffective because it does not reach the cases "where no express
promise exists or where there is no slight evidence from which to infer
a promise." 9
In other states the view is taken that the father is under a legal
obligation, irrespective of such relation of agency.10 If, therefore, he
does not provide necessaries for the child's support, according to his
means, the child may procure them from tradesmen or others upon
the father's credit."' The principle upon which these courts proceed
is that, since a parent is under a natural obligation to supply his minor
children with necessaries, if he neglects that duty, a third person supply-
ing such necessaries is deemed to have conferred a benefit upon the
delinquent parent for which the law raises an implied promise on his
part to pay. This rule, however, is subject to similar qualifications as is
the law of husband and wife, and if the father himself duly supplies
necessaries, a tradesman, who, in ignorance thereof, supplies like articles,
cannot recover' 
2
Equity has long exercised a salutary jurisdiction over cases of this
kind. In Equity, the parent's obligation to support a child is much
more than a principle of natural law; it is an obligation enforced where-
7Johnson v. Smallwood, 88 I1. 73 (1878); Freeman v. Robinson, 38 N. J. L. 383
(S.Ct., 1876).
8 Clothier v. Sigle, 73 N.J. L. 419, 63 Atl. 865 (S.Ct., 1906).
9 Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A. 2d 390, 392 (Mass., 1953).
10 Finn v. Adams, 138 Mich. 258, 101 N.W. 533 (1904); Manning v. Wells, 85 Hun.
(N.Y.) 27, 32 N.Y.S. 601 (1895); Porter v. Powell, 79 Ia. 151, 44 N.W. 295 (1890);
Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St. 452, 15 N.E. 471 (1887); Gilley v. Gilley, 79
Me. 292, 9 Atl. 623 (1887); Brow v. Brightman, 136 Mass. 187 (1883); cf. Sassaman v.
Wells, 178 Mich. 167, 144 N.W. 478 (1913); De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 203 N.Y.
460,96 N.E. 722 (1911).
11 Cases cited note 12 supra.
'
2 Johnson v. Smallwood, 88 I1. 73 (1878).
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ever equity has jurisdiction on equitable principles in the light of the
individual case.' 3 In the case of Ailing v. Ailing14 the court held that
although it has no jurisdiction to compel a parent to support an infant
child,15 the court will consider and determine the parent's duty toward
the child and his or her ability to perform that duty. However, the
court can make this determination only if the child has independent
property of his own and the question arises as to how much the parent
should be allowed from the fortune to support the child.
The instant case, in reversing the lower courts, held that it was not
bound by the decision in Freeman v. Robinson1s or any subsequent case
adhering to the view of that case because the question was never decided
by a New Jersey court of last resort. The court in the Freeman case
held that where the parent had given no authority to the child and
had entered into no contract, he would be no more liable for necessaries
than a mere stranger would be. The court preferred the earlier New Jersey
decision in Tomkins v. Tomkins'7 which followed Van Valkinburg v.
Watson,'8 a New York case enunciating the prevailing American view.
The court in the Tomkins case held that a parent was bound to provide
his infant children with necessaries and if he failed to do so, a stranger
could supply them and recover therefore. However, such third persons
must take notice of what is necessary for the infant, according to his
situation in life. Where the infant lives with his parents, and is provided
for by them, a person furnishing necessaries cannot charge the parent.'9
When the infant is sub potestate parentis, there must be a clear and pal-
pable omission of duty, in that respect, on the part of the parent, in order
to authorize any other person to act for, and charge the expense to the
parent.2 0
Just how strongly the instant court felt about the inequities of the
common law rule was apparent throughout the opinion but is best ex-
emplified in the following quotation:
13 Funk's Guardian v. Funk, 130 Ky. 354, 113 S.W. 419 (1908); In re Carter, 120 Ia.
215, 94 N.W. 488 (1903); McKnight's Executors v. Walsh, 24 N.J. Eq. 498 (1873);
Ex Parte Kane, 2 Barb. Ch. 375 (1847).
1452 N.J. Eq. 92, 96 (1893).
15 In re Ryder, 11 Paige (N.Y.) 185 (1844); Hodgens v. Hodgens, 4 C. & F. 323
(1837).
16 38 N.J. L. 383 (S.Ct., 1876).
17 11 N.J. Eq. 512 (1858).
18 13 Johns. (N.Y.) 480 (S.Ct., 1816).
19 Simpson v. Robertson, 1 Esp. 17 (1793); Ford v. Fothergill, I Esp. 211 (1793).
20 Van Valkinburg v. Watson, 13 Johns. (N.Y.) 480, 482 (S.Ct., 1816).
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It shocks one's sensibilities to think that the common law would permit
a wealthy parent to do no more than respond to the minimum demands
of the Poor Law [a statute providing for a maximum fine of 20s a month
for any parent neglecting his children], while he himself is living in affluence. 2'
The principles governing the application of the rule followed by the
New Jersey Supreme Court are set forth in three sections of the Re-
statement of the Law of Restitution.
22
A person who has performed the duty of another by supplying a third
person with necessaries, although acting without the other's knowledge or
consent, is entitled to restitution from the other therefore if (a) he acted
unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and (b) the things or
services supplied were immediately necessary to prevent serious bodily harm
to or suffering by such person.23
In Illinois, either an express promise, or circumstances from which a
promise by the father can be inferred, are necessary, in all cases, to bind
the parent for necessaries furnished his infant child by a third person.
24
The courts have held firmly to this view since Hunt v. Thompson 25 and
there is no indication in any of the subsequent decisions that a change
it contemplated. In the Hunt case, the court held:
• . . as a general rule, the obligation of a parent to provide for his offspring
is left to the natural and inextinguishable affection which Providence has im-
planted in the breast of every parent. This natural obligation, however, is
not only a sufficient consideration for an express promise by a father to pay
for necessaries furnished his child, but when taken in connection with various
circumstances, has been held to be sufficient to raise an implied promise to
that effect. 26
The common law has been superseded by the more enlightened,
humanitarian view as expressed in the instant case. It seems that the
only reason for its continuance in the minority of jurisdictions is the
fear of the modern rule's effect in operation. However, long experience
with the modern view in many jurisdictions has proven these fears to
be altogether groundless.
21 Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A. 2d 392, 398 (Mass., 1953).
22 §§ 112, 113, 114 (1937).
23 Rest., Restitution § 114 (1937).
24 Johnson v. Smallwood, 88 Ill. 73 (1878); Murphy v. Ottenheimer, 84 11. 39 (1876);
McMillen v. Lee, 78 11. 443 (1875); Hunt v. Thompson, 3 Scram. (111.) 179 (1840).
25 3 Scram. (Il1.) 179 (1840).
26 Ibid. at 180.
